INTRODUCTION
It is increasingly evident that the creation of transnational markets is less a function of trade and financial liberalization and more a function of creating transnational regulations (Djelic & SahlinAndersson, 2006; Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004) . International organizations like the WTO, regional regimes like the EU, NAFTA, CAFTA or the Mercosur, and a host of non-state actors, including multinational corporations (MNCs) and international NGOs, attempt to create public and private regulations. Motivations vary: to integrate markets by harmonizing conflicting domestic regulations, to manage social or environmental externalities of more open markets, or simply to weaken competitors (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000) . In turn, regulatory integration remains the locus of ongoing contestation by public and private actors that vary in their capacities to shape the definition of rules, the way they are implemented, and the distribution of their attendant costs and benefits.
This article examines how the extension of regulatory integration to developing countries affects the nature of these contestations and their outcomes both in terms of the spread of coordinated transnational regulations and in terms of their developmental outcomes. We use here the label 'developing' as shorthand for low-and middle-income countries outside of the core group of the most developed countries. The dramatic increase in attempts at regulatory integration involving less developed market economies brings a special twist into the patterns of contestation and the accompanying scholarly debates. The traditional concerns over transaction costs, social reproduction, and economic order are now linked to issues of differences in the capacities of advanced and developing countries to shape transnational rule making and benefit from the attendant redistribution of rights and obligations. As much as transnational regulatory integration could foster domestic institutional reforms in the developing world, it could as easily regulations include rules and standards derived from purely inter-governmental and regional agreements as well as those derived from domestic and external private actors (e.g., firms and NGOs) that may or may not be codified and enforced by national or supranational level public actors (Djelic & SahlinAndersson, 2006) .
Transnational regulatory integration is the process by which public and private actors from different countries attempt to create and implement common rules or standards that govern cross-border transactions and their potential positive and negative externalities.
It aims at bringing convergence in norms, rules and policies across countries (Sweet & Sandholtz, 1997 The first dimension assesses the degree to which transnational rules are adopted into law and enforced domestically. For the sake of simplicity, no enforcement includes not adopting the rule and adopting it only on the books but not enforcing it. The second dimension is the degree to which the successful or failed integration attempt benefits a relatively broad or narrow set of domestic constituents in developing countries.
At its most basic level, this variable captures the distribution of firms and firm stakeholders that may or may not be able to create the organizational capacities necessary to stay in the market and gain greater value-added opportunities (Bartley, 2010; Locke, 2013) ISSN 0034-7590
The combination of these two dimensions reveals four ideal types of outcome as presented in Exhibit 1. In Outcomes 1 and 2, regulatory integration attempts succeed in bringing about common, enforced rules or standards in a particular domain. They differ, however, in their distributive effects, namely whether a broad or narrow group of firms has the capacities to implement the standards.
Outcome 1 occurs when the transnational rules are enforced and implemented in ways that benefit a broad constituency in the relevant industry or domain domestically. This is akin to Mattli and Woods' (2009) (Duina, 2006) , some private actors may be strong enough to initiate cross-border voluntary regional standards in particular industries, like automotive, dairy, and grains (Costa & Jacoby, 2014; Lengyel & Delich, 2014) .
But relying on private regulations is usually unsustainable as it benefits only the few actors in control of entry to domestic or crossborder markets, which would thus be closer to Outcome 4 (Bartley, 2010; Locke, 2013) . At the same time, the benefits of this coordination can be sacrificed if the groups lack the power and processes with which to contest each other's claims or models (Evans, 2004; Tendler, 1997) .
Notice that emphasizing blockage to both institutional change and regulatory integration in these terms, rather than, say, pointing to pure state capture or culture, highlights some core institutional change governance dilemmas for an external actor -whether it is a MNC, a multilateral agency or a regional hegemon. One such dilemma is that without a dedicated empowerment of various key public and private (often weaker) actors, the benefits and sustainability will be limited. Another is that the large number and how to address them (Carothers, 2003; Easterly, 2006; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2009 groups that are better suited to undertake the given reform (Jacoby, 2004; Vachudova, 2005) . When multiplexity and joint problem solving are combined, they can greatly improve accountability and legitimacy among all parties as they join a "community of practice" that instills ownership and adherence to common norms (Bartley, 2010) . 
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